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ABSTRACT 
 
More than a decade has passed since the ‘common law conduit pipe principle’ was 
introduced into our South African law of taxation. Following this introduction in 1938, 
a trust has in some situations operated as a retainer or saver of the identity of certain 
types of amounts from the point the trust receives each amount type up until that 
amount exits the trust. Consequently these amounts are not exposed to normal tax 
even when they finally reach the hands of their beneficial owner. This principle was 
later incorporated into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 by the insertion of both section 
25B and para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to that Act. With the passage of time and 
taxpayers becoming more and more knowledgeable and consistently strategizing 
new ways of avoiding triggers of certain types of taxes, they realised that the conduit 
pipe principle could easily be manipulated within a discretionary trust to obtain 
various tax benefits. As a result of these tax benefits the use of discretionary trusts in 
South Africa is constantly on the rise. However, their continued use was first brought 
into question after the 2013 National Budget speech in which it was indicated that 
these types of trusts would no longer operate as a conduit pipe. This suggested the 
repeal of section 25B and para 80 of the Eighth Schedule. 
The doing away with the conduit pipe principle in our law of taxation has 
necessitated the imposition of the question whether its real purpose and value is 
properly understood. The National Treasury and SARS do not appear to fully 
comprehend this purpose – the purpose seems to be to facilitate the avoidance of 
normal tax. Hence the aim of this study is to attempt to determine the true purpose 
and value of this principle within our tax law system. This study realises this objective 
by embarking on an in-depth analysis of Armstrong v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1938 AD 343 which introduced this principle into our South African law of 
taxation. This study successfully found that the true purpose of the ‘conduit pipe 
principle’ is to rule out the possibility of double taxing the amount which has already 
suffered the consequences of tax at its originating source when it subsequently lands 
in the hands of its beneficial owner. This means that through the conduit pipe 
operation of a trust there is assurance that each identity of amount is protected 
against being lost between the time that amount is paid to the trust and the time the 
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trust pays it over to the beneficiary who will also take advantage of the exempt status 
of that amount in his hands. This tax benefit is only available if the amount is paid 
over in the year of assessment during which the trust received it – otherwise it gets 
caught up in the normal tax net in the beneficiary’s hands. Trustees successfully 
escape this trap by insisting on making this payment within the same tax period the 
trust received the amount. 
  The study also looked at the current normal tax treatment of the income that is 
inclusive of both local dividend(s) and interest from investment(s) and analysed the 
tax impact these types of amount have on reducing the taxable income of both a 
discretionary trust and its beneficiary. A comparison was made from a current 
income tax treatment point of view with the hypothetical time when the conduit pipe 
principle is finally abolished. It was discovered that beneficiaries of these types of 
trusts would be taxed more than they are currently being taxed as the dividends and 
basic interest exemption under the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 would no longer be 
available to them. A discretionary trust would no longer be an ideal tool to use in a 
tax avoidance strategy but will still be a good shelter for the protection of assets. This 
study further concludes that the conduit pipe principle should be retained in our law 
because it abolition was apparently recommendation on the basis of its true purpose 
being misunderstood for tax avoidance rather than avoidance of imposing double tax 
on an  amount that has already been taxed at its source.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction and research overview 
In South African law of taxation there is a common law principle called the conduit 
pipe principle.1 This principle was introduced into our jurisdiction in 1938.2 Since its 
introduction, it has received a lot of attention and provoked a lot of controversy. This 
principle was first mentioned in Armstrong which introduced it into South African 
law.3 The court in that case held that in the event the trust income is derived from 
dividends received from companies charged with normal tax under the fiscal 
legislation, the fact that the trustee (as a representative taxpayer) intervenes 
between the beneficiary receiving such income of the trust and the companies 
paying that dividend is no bar to the beneficiary claiming a section 10(1)(k) 
exemption in terms of the Act when that dividend is later paid by the trust to that 
beneficiary.4 The effect of the conduit pipe principle as expressed in Armstrong is 
that an exempt amount will not part with that status merely because that amount first 
passed through the trust before reaching the beneficiary and that status will remain 
even if the trust chooses to pay that amount out of its income, for example as an 
annuity – the exemption is still available.5 Although Armstrong was decided in1938, 
the principle still applies today. The rationale of this principle seems to be that an 
amount should not lose its identity when passing through the trust to the beneficiary. 
If an amount is exempt from normal tax when paid to the trust it will, subject to 
certain exceptions, retain this identity when paid to the beneficiary. The fact that the 
beneficiary thereof received it through a trust does not convert it into a taxable 
receipt in his hands. Even though the amounts received by the trust may be 
composed of different sources of income, as long as each type of amount remains 
identifiable in the hands of the beneficiary, all the expenses that are associated with 
                                                          
1 Armstrong v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1938 AD 343 (hereinafter referred as ‘Armstrong’). See also 
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Capital Gains Tax 1951. Trusts conduit pipe principle May 2011 - Issue 141: Available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2011/1951_Trusts_conduit_pipe_principle.htm (Accessed on: 
29/07/2018). 
2 Armstrong 348-349. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Stiglingh, M…et al Silke: South African Income Tax (2017) 831. 
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it may be claimed proportionately by the beneficiary when that income is later 
distributed to the same beneficiary - the principle will equally apply.6  
As with all other principles, it was desirous that the conduit pipe nature of a trust be 
limited in the sense of imposing a qualification on its operation. Hence the original 
identity of the amount can only be preserved if the trustee(s) distribute it to the 
beneficial owner within the tax year it arose.7 Thus If no distribution takes place 
within that tax year the principle will not apply and that amount will take on a new 
identity subjecting it to a different tax treatment. The reasoning of the court in 
Armstrong was followed in Polonsky8 in 1942. In that case the court made mention of 
the purpose of the conduit pipe principle for the second time, remarking as follows:9 
 
“In short, therefore, I rise from a perusal of the will and the facts of the stated case with a 
conviction that the balance of the income retained by the trustees belongs to the respondent's 
wife and to no one else; that the trustees are no more than a conduit pipe and have no material 
interest in her income.” 
 
This means the role and purpose of the trustee is, hypothetically speaking, like that 
of a bridge serving no other purpose other than allowing for the ‘crossing over’ of the 
income distributed from one side to the other. The operation of this principle enables 
taxpayers to pass on their normal tax liability to their beneficiaries who are often 
taxed at a low rate and enjoy a variety of tax exemptions.10 Apparently, this is one of 
many other tax benefits inherent in the application of this principle which led to its 
eventual legislative incorporation into our law.11 Although this principle has been 
strong enough to survive in our law of taxation which is characterized by its ever-
                                                          
6 Armstrong 349-351. 
7 Ibid, 832. 
8 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Polonsky 1942 TPD 249 (hereinafter referred as ‘Polonsky’).  
9 See Polonsky supra at 248. 
10 Brink, S.M., 2017, ‘An investigation into the future of discretionary trusts in South Africa: An income tax 
perspective: Part 2’, South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 20(1), a1789. 
https://doi.org/10.4102/ sajems.v20i1.1789 6 (hereinafter referred as ‘Brink’). See also R Swart Tax benefits of 
discretionary trusts: abolishment of the conduit pipe principle (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, North-West 
University, 2015) 2. 
11 Section 25B and Paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended 
(hereinafter referred as ‘Act 58 of 1962’). See also R Swart Tax benefits of discretionary trusts: abolishment of 
the conduit pipe principle (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, North-West University, 2015) 23-36.  
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changing tendencies and complexities its future is unclear. The Davis Tax 
Committee12 after having conducted an investigation into how taxpayers exploit 
discretionary trusts to achieve tax avoidance,13 through the manipulation of both 
estate duty and donations tax, recommended that this principle should be 
abolished.14 This abolition was recommended specifically in relation to ‘discretionary 
trusts’. Many questions have subsequently arisen questioning the use of these trusts 
in future and their taxation in our law leading to academic research being undertaken 
with a view to answering these questions.15 Before these studies16 were done, an 
analysis17 intending to clarify some of the crucial aspects regarding the then 
proposed amendments to the taxation of trusts was undertaken to investigate, 
among other issues, if without the conduit pipe principle, ‘discretionary trusts’ will still 
remain an effective estate planning tool in the future. By the ‘future’ it is meant the 
time when this principle is no longer part of our law. Brink’s article was based on the 
2013 National Budget Speech trust reform proposals18 and it concluded that those 
proposals were to be interpreted to mean the scrapping of the conduit pipe principle 
in section 25B and para 80 of the Eighth Schedule in the Act and the attribution rules 
in section 7. Although the 2013 National Budget Speech on trust reform by the then 
Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan will not be analysed in this dissertation, reference 
to it remains relevant as it formed the background leading to the recommendations 
for the abolition of the conduit pipe principle by the DTC in 2015. Occasional 
reference thereto cannot be avoided in this dissertation. 
                                                          
12 On 17 July 2013 the Minister of Finance, Mr Pravin Gordhan, announced the members of the Tax Review 
Committee (the Committee) as well as the Committee’s Terms of Reference. This gave effect to the Minister’s 
previous announcement in February 2013 when he tabled the 2013/14 Budget that government will initiate a 
tax review this year “to assess our tax policy framework and its role in supporting the objectives of inclusive 
growth, employment, development and fiscal sustainability”. It was decided at the inaugural meeting of the 
Committee on 25 July 2013 that the Committee will be known as The Davis Tax Committee (DTC). 
13See M Loubser ‘A Case Study Analysis of the Impact of the Davis Tax Committee’s First Interim Report on 
Estate Duty on certain Trust and Estate Planning Structures Used by South African Residents’ (Unpublished M 
Com Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016) 2-3. 
14 Ibid. 
15  SM Brink & LC Willemse ‘An Investigation into the Future of Discretionary Trusts in South Africa –An Income 
Tax Perspective’ Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences | JEF | October 2014 7(3), pp. 797-818 
(hereinafter referred as ‘Brink & Willemse’). See also M R Hussain Taxation in South Africa and the use of 
Trusts as an Effective Estate Planning and Tax Saving Mechanism (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, 2015), see also R Swart Tax benefits of discretionary trusts: abolishment of the conduit pipe 
principle (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, North-West University, 2015). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Brink & Willemse (supra) 797-818. 
18 Brink (supra) 3. 
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Interestingly enough, on 24 August 2016 the Second and Final Report on Estate 
Duty by the DTC was released and whilst it relaxed certain of the initial 
recommendations made in its First Report, it still maintained the repeal of both 
section 7 and the conduit pipe principle embodied in the relevant section and 
paragraph.19 The DTC’s recommended tax treatment of discretionary trusts is 
summarized as follows:  
                                                          
19 See section 25B regarding the taxation of the income of trusts and beneficiaries of trusts. This section 
provides as follows:  
(1) Any amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during any year of assessment in 
his or her capacity as the trustee of a trust, shall, subject to the provisions of section 7, to the extent 
to which that amount has been derived for the immediate or future benefit of any ascertained 
beneficiary who has a vested right to that amount during that year, be deemed to be an amount 
which has accrued to that beneficiary, and to the extent to which that amount is not so derived, be 
deemed to be an amount which has accrued to the trust.  
(2)  Where a beneficiary has acquired a vested right to any amount referred to in subsection (1) in 
consequence of the exercise by the trustee of a discretion vested in him or her in terms of the 
relevant deed of trust, agreement or will of a deceased person, that amount shall for the purposes 
of that subsection be deemed to have been derived for the benefit of that beneficiary. 
(3) Any deduction or allowance which may be made under the provisions of this Act in the 
determination of the taxable income derived by way of any amount referred to in subsection (1), 
must, to the extent to which that amount is under that subsection deemed to be an amount which 
has accrued to –  
(a) a beneficiary, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the 
determination of the taxable income derived by that beneficiary;  
(b) the trust, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the determination of 
the taxable income derived by that trust. See also paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 58 
of 1962. This paragraph deals with the taxation of capital gains of a trust and it provides as follows: 
(1) Subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72, where a capital gain is determined in respect of the 
vesting by a trust of an asset in a trust beneficiary (other than any person contemplated in 
paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a resident, that gain –  
(a) must be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or aggregate 
capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary to whom that asset was so disposed of.  
(2) Subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72, where a capital gain is determined in respect of the 
disposal of an asset by a trust in a year of assessment during which a trust beneficiary (other than 
any person contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a resident has a vested interest or 
acquires a vested interest (including an interest caused by the exercise of a discretion) in that 
capital gain but not in the asset, the disposal of which gave rise to the capital gain, the whole or 
portion of the capital gain so vested-  
(a) must be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or aggregate 
capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary in whom the gain vests.  
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(a) That the income of this type of trust must be assessable to tax in the hands of 
its beneficiary if it is clear from the provisions of the trust deed itself that the 
income as well as the capital is vested in the said beneficiary; and 
(b) If it is also clear that both such income and capital are not so vested the 
definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1 of the Act must be used to identify the 
hands in which such income and capital is to be assessed for normal tax 
purposes.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to investigate the future of the discretionary 
trusts in South Africa. This dissertation will only examine the conduit pipe principle. It 
will attempt to answer the question whether this principle should be retained in our 
law or not by investigating its true purpose. It is clear that the abolition of this 
principle will, to a certain extent, limit the attractiveness that these types of trusts 
enjoy.  
 
1.1  Purpose of the study 
This dissertation will analyse Armstrong in depth with the main objective being the 
full comprehension of the purpose and value of this principle in the South African 
law. Then this dissertation will examine the link between this principle and the use of 
discretionary trusts. This link will be examined in order to determine if tax avoidance 
is incidental to the functioning of this principle or whether it is the main purpose that 
this principle is intended to serve, hence warranting the understanding that both the 
Fiscus and the Treasury have of it. 
   As far as the abolition of the conduit pipe principle is concerned the reasons 
advanced by the Fiscus and the National Treasury seem to support the conclusion 
that they have little apprehension of what the purpose of the conduit pipe principle is 
in our law. Thus the aim of this dissertation is to investigate this purpose. This 
purpose will then be used to answer the core question of this study – whether we 
should retain this principle in our law? Although the current tax treatment of 
discretionary trusts will be analysed in this dissertation, this will only be done in order 
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to clearly illustrate the hypothetical scenarios that will arise if the conduit pipe 
principle is done away with. 
 
1.2  Research methodology 
The research methodology that this dissertation will adopt is desk-based. It will be a 
purely qualitative analysis of tax cases in which the conduit pipe principle was 
applied by the courts of law, legislation to the extent that it deals with the conduit 
pipe principle and literature on the subject of the taxation of trusts. 
 
1.3  Scope of the study 
The analysis of case law, legislation and literature will only be limited to South 
African taxation law. Although the purpose of this study is not on the study of 
discretionary trusts and how they are taxed, these trusts will be examined only to the 
extent that it is necessary to demonstrate the application and functioning of the 
conduit pipe principle. 
 
1.4  Chapter outline 
This dissertation will consist of five chapters. Chapter one will be an introductory 
chapter. It will focus on the introduction and the general overview of the research 
problem. Chapter two will contain the historical development of the conduit pipe 
principle and examine its purpose in South African law as expressed in Armstrong. It 
is in this chapter that the true purpose of the conduit pipe principle will be examined 
and the answer to the research question in paragraph 1.1 (above) be provided. 
Chapter three will look at what is a discretionary trust and what are the reasons for 
creating this trust. Chapter four will examine the current taxation treatment of this 
type of trust focusing on the current income tax benefits to beneficiary arising from 
the application of the conduit pipe principle. It will then examine if this trust will still 
retain those tax benefits should the conduit pipe principle be abolished in our law. 
Chapter five will contain the conclusion of this dissertation. This will be the 
conclusion from the discussions in the preceding chapters.  
16 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 gave a brief discussion of the introduction of the conduit pipe principle into 
our domestic law. It also gave a historical overview of how this principle developed 
through case law to what it is today. As was pointed out in that chapter this 
dissertation will attempt to provide clarity as to the real purpose of this principle in 
our law. This chapter will only be devoted to investigating this purpose. This purpose 
will be determined by discussing and analysing Armstrong in depth and focusing on 
the rationale behind the court’s judgment in that case. This rationale will suggest the 
real purpose of this principle. As will appear from the following analysis of Armstrong 
only what is relevant for the purposes of this chapter is discussed and analysed. 
 
2.2 Historical development of the Conduit Pipe Principle in South African Law 
2.2.1 Facts in Armstrong:20 
Mrs Armstrong survived her husband Mr G. S. Armstrong who died testate in 1934. 
Mr Armstrong’s assets in his estate were a mortgage bond, share investment and 
landed property. His Will entitled Mrs Armstrong to receive the net income of the 
residue of his estate for her lifetime. This right to receive this amount was then ceded 
by her to her three daughters in undivided equal shares in July 1935. On this very 
day her daughters executed a trust deed in which they ceded their rights (initially Mrs 
Armstrong’s) to this trust. This trust was directed that an annual payment of £2, 000 
must be made to Mrs Armstrong after the trustees have paid income tax on it. The 
trust further provided that if a balance still remained after this annual payment £100 
is to be paid to another beneficiary. If a balance still remained another beneficiary 
was to be paid £50 and the last beneficiary was also to be paid £50 if a balance still 
remained after all these payments had been made. At the end of the tax year 30 
June 1936 the trust had gross receipts of £4, 580 0s. 7d. of which £ 2, 773. 0s 6d 
                                                          
20 Armstrong 345-347. 
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was from dividends. The trustees accordingly paid Mrs Armstrong £2, 000 and 
withheld £ 469 16s. 11d. as income tax payable on it. However, her tax return 
showed that her income was £ 2, 469 16s. 11d and was made up as follows: £1, 495 
7s. 10d. was derived from dividends and £974 9s. 1d. was derived from rents and 
interest. The Commissioner included the whole £2,469 16s. 11d in her income. Mrs 
Armstrong objected to this inclusion and appealed against it to the Special Court for 
Hearing Income Tax Appeals on the ground that as £1,495 7s. 10d. of this sum 
represented dividends was exempt from normal tax under section 10(1)(k) of the 
Income Tax Act 40 of 1925 and had to be excluded in the calculation of her taxable 
income.  
The Special Court correctly held that to the extent that the taxpayer’s income could 
be apportioned to each separate source from which it was received, section 10(1)(k) 
of the 1925 Act as claimed by the taxpayer was indeed applicable to the dividends 
portion of the income.21 Hence an amount of £1,495 7s. 10d.of the £2,469 16s. 11d 
was exempt from normal tax.22 
The Commissioner felt that the Special Court’s decision could not be correct in law 
and requested that the following questions be stated for the consideration of the 
Natal Provincial Division:23 
 
“...(2) Whether the amount of £2,469 16s. 11d. must be allocated over the three heads of 
revenue from which the Estate late G. S. Armstrong derived its income for the year in question.  
(3) Whether the amount of £1,495 7s. 10d. being the proportion of the said amount of £2,469 
16s. 11d. which was allocated to dividends on the basis referred to in the preceding 
subparagraph, was derived by the taxpayer by way of dividends, and  
(4) Whether the exemption under section 10(1)(k) of the Act 40 of 1925 applies to £1,495 7s. 
10d.”  
 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 346. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, 346-347. 
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The Natal Provincial Division answered the above questions in favour of the 
Commissioner. Mrs Armstrong escalated this decision to the Appellate Division. The 
decision of this court is discussed in the following paragraph.  
 
2.2.2 Analysis of the Appellate Division’s Judgment 
It was clear form these questions that the Commissioner sought to tax the whole 
£2,469 16s. 11d as income in Mrs Armstrong’s hands. The Appellate Court stated that 
the most important question in the present case was to determine whether £1,495 7s. 
10d. properly fell within section 10(1)(k),24 and how the trust itself, paying this amount, 
had been brought into being was not important.25 The provisions of section 10(1)(k) 
that  were relied on by Mrs Armstrong both at the Special Court and Natal Provincial 
Division are that dividends received from any company must be exempt.26 The Natal 
Provincial Division decided that Mrs Armstrong could not succeed in this argument for 
the following reasons, namely, (a), section 10(1)(k) required a direct relationship 
between the company paying the dividend and the person receiving the dividend; and 
(b), Mrs Armstrong could not sue the company for the payment of the dividend 
because she received that dividend through the trust created by her daughters and 
hence the required direct relationship between her and the company was thus 
absent.27 
The Appellate Division was of the following view regarding the above reasons of the 
Natal Provincial Division:28  
 
“[T]he crux of the question lies in the simple fact of the intervention of a trustee between the 
companies and the appellant. It was this intervention which the Provincial Division considered 
fatal to the claim for exemption under section 10(1)(k).”  
 
                                                          
24 Ibid, 347. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 348. 
28 Ibid, 347. 
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  The Appellate Division, per Stratford, C.J. refused to accept the reasoning of the 
Natal Provincial Division. This reasoning was irreconcilable with the purpose behind 
section 10(1)(k) which clearly required the consideration of the Act as a whole.29 The 
reasoning of the Natal Provincial Division was clearly not in line with this purpose. 
According to the Appellate Division, this purpose of section 10(1)(k) could be 
understood by making a supposition that Mrs Armstrong was the only beneficiary of 
the trust and the income of this trust was received by the trustees solely from the 
companies.30 If it was then assumed that the reasoning of the Natal Provincial Division 
reflected the correct construction of this section, the intervention of the trustee 
between the companies and Mrs Armstrong is what prevents the latter from claiming 
the exemption and making it possible for the Commissioner to tax the same amount 
twice.31 This supposition really exposed the incorrectness in the line of reasoning that 
was adopted by the Natal Provincial Division.  
  The fact that Mrs Armstrong could not sue the companies for the payment of 
dividends could not be used as a yardstick to determine if she fell within the section or 
not.32 Accepting this test would defeat the purpose of the section because this would 
mean if a trustee is put in the company’s register as a shareholder on behalf a minor 
the company could not be sued as the companies do not recognise a shareholder 
registered in a representative capacity.33  The Appellate Division had the following to 
say in this regard:34 
 
“…consequences of this kind do not accord with the scheme of the Act which clearly is that 
income derived from companies should, in the hands of the true recipients of it, be free of the 
tax which has already been deducted at the source.” 
 
Thus what is decisive for claiming the exemption is not the physical receipt of the 
dividend itself but the source - as the purpose of the section is to free from normal tax 
                                                          
29 Ibid, 348. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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what has already been taxed at the source.35 It is interesting how the ‘representative 
nature of a trustee’ was analysed by the Appellate Division in justifying its construction 
of section 10(1)(k).36 Although it is the trustee that receives the amount and eventually 
distributes it to the beneficiary, that amount is in truth received by the beneficiary from 
the company.37 This is so because that dividend amount is largely depended on the 
performance of the company – if it makes profit or not.38 The ‘trustee’ can neither 
increase the company profit nor decrease it because in truth a trustee is nothing but a 
‘conduit pipe’ and his or her interposition between Mrs Armstrong and the companies 
could not bar her from falling within section 10(1)(k).39 Neither could the fact that she 
received a fixed annual amount, nor the fact that such annuity was paid out of income 
that was made up of amounts derived from different sources could bar her for claiming 
the exemption.  The Appellate Division held the following view:40 
 
  “Though the appellant is to receive a fixed amount out of the fund in any one year that amount 
must be a certain ascertainable fraction of the whole fund distributable and, therefore, 
apportionment can be calculated on the ratio principle just as simply as if she were given a 
fraction of the fund.” 
 
Mrs Armstrong’s appeal was accordingly allowed and the decision of the Natal 
Provincial Division reversed. 
 
2.2 The purpose of the conduit pipe principle 
As appears from the facts in Armstrong in paragraph 2.1.1 (above) the income of a 
trust is rarely composed of a single type of amount.41 This means that it is often 
made up of different types of amounts. Some of these amounts are exempt from 
normal tax and some are not. Those which are exempt are not included in the 
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37 Ibid, 349. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, 351. 
41 Ibid, 346-347. 
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calculation of the taxpayer’s taxable income while those that are not exempt must be 
included. With their different identities these amounts all go into the same ‘pool’, 
namely the trust. The question that arises is what happens to their identities when 
they go into this pool and later go out – do they each retain their original identity or 
do they lose it and adopt a different one? This was clearly the issue in Armstrong. 
The Commissioner believed that when an amount that is exempt from normal tax 
together with one that is not exempt goes into the trust the exempt amount gets 
contaminated by the non-exempt amount with the result that both amounts become 
subject to normal tax.42 This belief suggested that the amount of £1, 495 7s. 10d. 
derived from dividends was to be subject to normal tax as it had been mingled in with 
the other funds of the trust, with £974 9s. 1d. derived from rents and interest which 
were subject to this type of tax. The argument against the inclusion of £1, 495 7s. 
10d. in the taxable income of the Mrs Armstrong was that the moneys paid to the 
estate of the late Mr Armstrong remained identifiable as such in her hands43 and it 
was immaterial how many persons were interposed between the respective 
companies and herself, provided such persons received the moneys in a 
representative capacity and received no beneficial interests therein, as they are and 
were purely conduit pipes and administrative pegs, whose function is and was to 
pass on dividends less expenses of administration.44 The court agreed with this 
argument by the taxpayer and pointed out that the crux of the question lay in the 
simple fact of the intervention of a trustee between the companies and the 
appellant.45 It was this intervention which the Provincial Division considered fatal to 
the claim for exemption under section 10(1)(k).46 With regard to this ‘intervention’ the 
court held that “in the truest sense the beneficiary derives his income from the 
company, for that income fluctuates with the fortunes of the company and the trustee 
can neither increase nor diminish it, because he is a mere ‘conduit pipe’.”47 This 
clearly suggests that the trustee is just a hand that receives the money from the 
source and hand it over to its rightful owner. And nothing more! This suggestion is 
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supported by the analysis of the true legal nature of the role of the trustee(s) of a 
trust. As to the normal tax liability of a trustee the court held as follows:48 
 
“He is liable to pay the tax "as if the income were income received by .or in favour of him 
beneficially." He is entitled, however, to the deductions, etc, that his cestui que trust is allowed 
and also he is entitled to be indemnified by the latter. On these provisions the Trustee could 
not be assessed on dividends derived from companies whatever test be applied. Now we 
cannot suppose that the Legislature had in mind two measures of taxable income, one when 
the Commissioner elected to tax the representative and another if the beneficiary was taxed. 
So that in contemplation of the Act when the beneficiary is taxed instead of the representative 
it is on the basis of his receiving directly what he in fact gets through the medium of his 
representative.” 
 
It follows from this passage that the trustee is entitled to utilise any exemption that the 
relevant Income Tax Act attaches to any type of amount the trustee receives so long 
that he or she does so in his or her representative capacity only. This means that the 
exemption is claimed in the name of the beneficiary and consequently the amount will 
therefore be exempt in the hands of that beneficiary when later distributed to him or 
her. This approach by the court reinforced the notion against double taxation that 
would have resulted if the court had held that the intervention of a trustee prevents the 
beneficiary from the claiming of the exemption under section 10(1)(k) of the Act owing 
to the taxpayer not having received the dividends ‘herself’ or directly from the 
companies.  
   Where the income of a trust is derived from dividends received from companies 
chargeable with normal tax under the Income Tax Act 40 of 1925, the fact that the 
trustee intervenes between the beneficiary receiving the income of the trust and the 
companies is no bar to a claim by such beneficiary of the section 10(1)(k) exemption 
thereon.49 Even if the income of the Trust is derived partly from such dividends and 
partly from income liable to normal tax and is divisible among a number of 
beneficiaries, each beneficiary is entitled to claim exemption for a proportionate 
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amount of the total income received from the trustee.50 The fact that the trustee 
distributes a balance after paying expenses and deducting commission does not affect 
the position, for such expenses are to be apportioned to the income in respect of which 
the expenses were incurred or, if incurred in connection with both kinds of income, 
proportionately to each kind of income and the principle applied even though Mrs 
Armstrong, instead of receiving a fraction of the total income, receives a fixed amount 
out of the income each year.51 
  From the above analysis it is clear that that the real purpose of the conduit pipe 
principle can briefly be summarized as follows: (1). Amounts retain their individual 
identity when  they go into the trust and retain these identities up to the point they 
reach their beneficial owner; and (2).  As long as the beneficiary is to receive an 
ascertainable portion of the income of the trust that is composed of income from 
different amounts, exempt and those that are subject to normal tax, the rules relating 
to apportionment will always apply.  
 
2.3 Confirmation of the conduit pipe principle 
As regards the tax liability of the trustee of a trust specifically, the court in Polonsky 
confirmed the ‘conduit pipe’ nature of a trust holding as follows:52 
 
“…in terms of sec. 49(1) every representative taxpayer shall be liable to assessment in his 
own name in respect of that income, but any such assessment shall be deemed to be made 
upon him in his representative capacity only. As a general rule the representative taxpayer 
defined in sec. 48(c) would be liable to assessment in respect of income of persons' who 
cannot be taxed direct…” 
 
The court in Armstrong also had to interpret section 48(c) of the Income Tax Act 40 of 
1925. In that case the court held that the trustee is liable to pay the tax only to the 
extent that it is assumed that the income received by him is his own and as 
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compensation he is entitled to the deductions and exemptions that his cestui que trust 
is allowed and also to be indemnified by the latter. As appears from the quote above, 
Polonsky took this interpretation a step further holding that the only time a 
representative taxpayer is liable is in respect of persons’ who cannot be taxed direct 
and in cases where the beneficiaries of the trust income are uncertain. 
 
2.4 The conduit pipe nature is not absolute 
In our law the operation of the conduit pipe principle is qualified. The qualification is 
that the nature of an amount received as a dividend by the trustee must exit the trust 
within the tax year of its receipt.53 The court in Rosen54 meant this when it said the 
follows:55  
 
“…a trust deed may bestow the trustee with a discretion to pass on dividends to the beneficiary 
or to retain and accumulate them. If he decides on the latter, I think(but express no firm view) 
that the dividends, so that, if they are subsequently paid out to the beneficiary, they might 
possibly no longer be dividends in his hands, for the conduit-pipe had turned itself off at the 
relevant time. But if he decides on the former, i.e. to pass the dividends on to the beneficiary, 
the condition suspending the beneficiary’s entitlement thereto is fulfilled, and they would 
constitute dividends in his hands in the same way as if he had been originally entitled to them 
unconditionally under the trust deed…” 
 
From the above it follows that unless a distribution takes place in the same tax year 
that dividend is received, the identity or character of that dividend cannot be saved. 
In the subsequent tax year it will have turned within the trust and assumed a new 
identity triggering the normal tax consequences in the hands of the beneficiary. This 
suggests that the conduit pipe principle is limited in its application and does not apply 
where a receipt of a dividend takes place in the present tax year and its distribution 
to the beneficiary takes place in the following tax year. It is noteworthy that the 
conduit pipe principle will still apply even if the beneficiary receives an annuity from 
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the trust the income of which is solely made up of dividend income.56 The beneficiary 
will still be receiving a dividend. That annuity is regarded as a dividend in the 
beneficiary’s hands for normal tax purposes.57 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the real purpose of the common law conduit 
pipe in South African law by critically looking at how the court established this principle. 
Armstrong was used mainly because this is the case that introduced the principle into 
our law. From the analysis of this case it was found that the real purpose of this 
principle is to prevent the incident of taxing the same amount twice by preserving its 
identity when passing through a trust until it reaches the beneficial owner and that the 
existence of a trust through which the amount is paid does not prevent the beneficiary 
thereof from claiming an allowed deduction or exemption on that amount. It was also 
found that this principle is not without its limitations – the conduit pipe principle can 
only preserve the original nature of an amount for a period as long as one unbroken 
tax year. Thus after the passing of a tax year an exempt amount that has been in the 
trust  is no longer exempt in the hands of its beneficial owner when finally paid to them. 
Thus this chapter successfully proved that tax avoidance was never within the 
intendment of this principle – tax avoidance is an incidental consequence of its 
operation. The purpose was to avoid double taxation as per the reasons advanced by 
the Appellate Division.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3.1Introduction 
Trusts in South Africa are currently used by taxpayers to achieve various objectives. 
These objectives may, for example relate to tax or be purely directed at protecting 
the taxpayer’s assets or property. Our history seems to clearly suggest that although 
trusts are now part of law, the concept of the trust was not easy to comprehend 
because it was never ours. Hence our courts and the legislature had to each play a 
role in unpacking this concept. This chapter will discuss how the concept of the trust 
was introduced into our law and the benefits of a trust. It will appear from this 
discussion that the type of each trust as well as the rights a beneficiary of that trust 
has to either income or capital gains of that trust have different tax consequences for 
that trust and the beneficiary. However, it must be pointed out that the discussion in 
this chapter will only focus on the discretionary trusts.   
 
3.2 The trusts historical development and definition 
Trusts were foreign to South Africa until the British settlers arrived in the Cape and 
Natal.58 Their historical legal development in our law is succinctly summarized by 
Goebel as follows:59 
“The legal development of trusts in South Africa spans a period of 150 years, with the earliest 
reported case in 1833. The trust was a legal institution not known to Roman or Roman-Dutch 
Law, and was brought to South Africa in the Nineteenth Century by the British Settlers in the 
Cape and Natal. These settlers were first to use the word 'trust' in their wills, their antenuptial 
contracts, and their transfers of land. This use of trusts went on for approximately a century 
before the courts were called upon to decide authoritatively on the concept of trusts, whether 
or not it formed part of South African law, and if so, on what basis.” 
                                                          
58 A Goebel ‘The Taxation of Trusts: An Analysis of s25B and the Anti-Avoidance Provisions contained in s7 of 
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The issue was finding one flexible definition that could be utilized in any situation to 
successfully determine whether there is a valid trust without having to ask how, if it 
does exist, it was established or its current administration.60 Our law of trusts 
recognizes and distinguishes between trusts in both a wide and a narrow sense,61 like 
other English speaking countries. In these countries the wide sense to a trust suggests 
that a trust exists if (a), there is a person incumbent with a task to hold the property 
placed under his or her control not for oneself but for another person – the real owner 
and (b), there must be an obligation or duty on that person to keep the property he 
administers separate from his personal estate.62 This means that unless these two 
requirements are present in a situation no trust can be said to exist in the wide sense. 
Thus in the wide sense there cannot be a trust until there is a relationship to which the 
law attaches a responsibility on one person to hold the property for someone else. 
However, in the strict sense which is also known as a narrow sense a trust is said to 
exist at the moment when its creator hands either the control or proceeds of that 
property to the trustee to administer for another.63 It is clear from these two different 
approaches used to decide whether a trust does exist that for a wide sense approach 
the two requirements must simultaneously be present. This is not required in the 
narrow sense approach as it only places emphasis on either the handing over of 
control to someone or that profits generated from the property be administered by the 
trustee instead of the property itself.  
 
3.3 Statutory definition of a trust v the Judicial definition 
In 1988 an attempt was made by the Legislature to provide a definition for what 
constitutes a trust through the introduction of the Trust Property Control Act.64 A 
‘trust’ is defined in section 1 of the TPC Act as follows:  
“The arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is by virtue of a trust 
instrument made over or bequeathed –  
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(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of 
according the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust 
instrument; or  
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the 
control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the 
provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons designated 
in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust instrument, but 
does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person 
as executer, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 
1965 (Act 66 of 1965).” 
 
   This definition does more than merely providing the definition of what a trust is. It 
also provides answers as to the question of what type of a relationship gives rise to 
the existence of a trust and the extent of control one must have over the property for 
the benefit of another. Clearly this definition embraces how both the wide sense and 
the narrow sense determine the existence of a trust although these approaches do 
not define what a trust is. For the purposes of taxation of trusts the Act defines a 
‘trustee’ as follows:65 
 
“ “ trustee”, in addition to every person appointed or constituted as such by act of parties, by 
will, by order of declaration of court or by operation of law, includes an executor or 
administrator, tutor or curator, and any person having the administration or control of any 
property subject to a trust, usufruct, fideicommissum or other limited interests or acting in any 
fiduciary capacity or having, either in a private or in an official capacity, the possession, 
direction, control or management of any property of any person under legal disability;” 
 
The judiciary has also assisted in defining this concept. In Est Kemp v MacDonald’s 
Trustee,66 Innes CJ stated that the word ‘trustee’ is an English word and it refers to a 
person given a duty to deal with the property put under their control for the benefit of 
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those on behalf of whom he controls that property.67 Thus the ownership and 
beneficial interest should vest in the beneficiary and not in the trustee unless he is 
both trustee and beneficiary.68 
 
Also In Zinn NO v Westminster Bank NO,69 Stratford CJ said that there was no 
magic in the use of word ‘trustee’. Apart from the statutory definition it means one 
who is entrusted with the affairs of another.70  
However, in McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd,71 Innes CJ took the concept one step 
further, distinguishing a trustee from an agent remarking that being a ‘trustee’, as 
opposed to an ‘agent’ requires that the person concerned has the dominus of that 
property place under his or her control.72 
 
What emerges from these definitions is that our law recognizes a trust as a legal 
institution designed to hold property on behalf of another person(s) and the trustee is 
nothing more than the hand that ensures that the objectives of the trustee are 
realized. 
 
3.4 Two categories of trusts 
South African tax law recognizes and divides trusts into two categories. These trusts 
are mortis causa (testamentary) and inter vivos trusts.73 In either of these trusts an 
ordinary or special trust can be created.74 A testamentary trust comes into being as a 
result of a bequest in a will75 to ensure, for example, that the deceased’s children or 
surviving spouse or both will be taken care of after his death.76 A testamentary trust 
                                                          
67Honoré, T & Cameron E ‘Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts’ 4 ed Cape Town: Juta, (2002) 9. (hereinafter 
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can therefore only come into being at the moment of the deceased’s passing on. 
Hence the duty of the trustee(s) is thus to ensures that there is an ongoing 
generation of income to meet the living expenses of the deceased’s children and/or 
surviving spouse.77 An inter vivos trust is, on the other hand, created and comes into 
being during the life time of its creator or founder78 and is mostly utilized to save 
estate duty on founder’s death.79 Taxpayers prefer this type of trust because of 
various other tax benefits they derive while still alive.80 These tax benefits will be 
discussed in the following Chapter. However, it must be noted that inter vivos trusts 
can further be distinguished into discretionary trusts and vested trusts.81 
 
3.4.1 Discretionary inter vivos trust 
As opposed to trust under which the beneficiary is certain to get trust property or 
income, in a discretionary trust no beneficiary has a vested right to the trust property 
or funds.82 Thus the trustee is at liberty to decide how much is to be distributed to 
each beneficiary and who should get the property of the trust.83 It therefore of 
importance to be able to differentiate the kinds of rights the beneficiary has under an 
inter vivos trust.84 The beneficiary will always have either a conditional or vested right 
but not legal ownership because this will always be for the trustee.85 The former only 
retains his or her beneficial ownership.86 The precise nature of the right the 
beneficiary enjoys establishes who should bear the normal tax liability on the trust 
income between the trust and the beneficiary during a particular tax year.87 
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3.4.2 Vested right v Contingent right 
The line that separates both a vested right and a contingent right has been clearly 
defined by our courts and thus there is certainty as to what these rights are. In ITC 
7688 the Special Court distinguished the nature of the beneficiary’s right as follows:89 
 
“Vesting implies the transfer of dominium, and the children had clearly not in the year under 
review acquired dominium of the trust income or any portion thereof. A vested right was 
something substantial; something which could be measured in money; something which had 
a present value and could be attached. A contingent interest was merely a spes – an 
expectation which might never be realised. From its very nature it could not have a definite 
present value. In the income tax sense, therefore, a vested right was an accrued right.” 
 
In ITC 132890 it was held that ‘vesting’ does not necessarily mean the beneficiary 
concerned must have a right to payment91 and that in the present case the income 
was vested in the beneficiaries as each of them had already obtained a right to such 
income even though its actual enjoyment had been successfully delayed.92 
 
Thus as opposed to a vested right, a contingent right is just an expectation with no 
guarantee that it will be fulfilled. The beneficiary may also obtain the former right to 
the trust income through the exercise of trustee’s discretion.93 This means that even 
though no vested right in the beneficiaries may be inferred from the provisions of the 
trust deed, vesting may nonetheless still take place if the trustee decides to exercise 
his or her discretion and make a distribution on that basis. The result of that vesting 
is that should the beneficiary die before actually receiving that income it will fall into 
his or her deceased estate.94 It is suggested that a vested right in relation to a trust 
income includes (a).income that has become due to the be beneficiary;95 (b).income 
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that is credited to the beneficiary on account;96(c).income that has been dealt with for 
the sole benefit of that beneficiary.97 In all these instances the beneficiary has a 
vested right. 
 
3.4.3 General purpose of establishing a trust 
Before the tax implications attaching to the conditional nature or otherwise of a 
beneficiary’s right to the trust income and the exercise of the discretion by the trustee 
are considered it is necessary to look at why one may choose to utilize a trust. 
Generally, a trust is created for various reasons depending on the motive of each 
individual person.98 The motive may be as innocent as wanting to ensure that the 
property of the person will not dissipate after his death or even to ensure a 
continuous running of a business after his death.99 However, estate planners find the 
use of discretionary trusts very efficient in minimizing tax liability100 rather than the 
motive for it use being the protection of assets against the uncertain eventualities of 
life.101 From an estate duty saving point of view, the founder of the trust sells his 
valuable assets to the trust so that any further growth in their value accrues to the 
trust102 which ensures that such assets will not fall into his or her estate on death.103  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter found that although defining what a trust is has always not been an 
easy task, our courts have played a major role in developing a set of characteristics 
that, if they are all present in a particular case, a trust can be said to exist. It is also 
clear from the preceding discussions that even though a trust may be a testamentary 
trust or an inter vivos trust the shared characteristic between the two types of trust is 
that the property is always held by the trust on behalf of someone – a beneficiary 
which may be certain or uncertain at that point. It is always important to determine 
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the nature of a right that the beneficiary has under the discretionary trust as the tax 
treatment of its income is contingent on the nature of the beneficiary’s right, which in 
turn affects the impact of the conduit pipe principle on the tax consequences of the 
trust. The following chapter will discuss the normal tax implications of the right to the 
income and/or profits that are capital in nature. It will also look at the role the conduit 
pipe principle plays in the determination of the normal tax liability for both the 
discretionary trust beneficiary and the trust itself  and then will conclude with a 
discussion on whether, if this principle is abolished so will the tax benefits it currently 
offers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
4.1 Introduction to the tax benefit of a discretionary trust 
There are basically many reasons for which one may use a trust.104 More often than 
not the main reason is to avoid or minimize the incidence of taxation.105 Taxpayers 
avoid this tax incident by using a ‘discretionary trust’ and get around the tax rules in 
section 7 of the Act.106 These rules are avoided by giving the trustee(s) a discretion 
to vest the income of the trust to that beneficiary who is often taxed in a lower tax 
bracket than other beneficiaries or the creator of the trust himself.107 The tax benefit 
here is that the income and/or capital gain is not subject to normal tax at a rate 
applying to either the trust or the creator of that trust. The common law conduit pipe 
principle brings in an additional tax advantage. As the income of the trust would be 
made up of amounts from different sources, the beneficiary will be entitled to claim 
all allowable deductions and exemptions the Act permits thereon. This tax advantage 
that this principle offers within a discretionary trust is amongst, if not at the forefront 
of, the reasons this type of trust has enjoyed a lot of attention over the past years. 
The questions that this chapter will attempt to address are: (a), what does the 
abolition of this principle in our law means for section 25B, section 7 and para 80 of 
the Eighth Schedule, and (b), what would happen to the use of discretionary trusts if 
this principle is abolished? It is necessary to point out before these questions are 
answered that although this chapter is devoted to answering these questions the 
main focus is placed on the current normal tax benefits inherent in the application of 
the conduit pipe principle – that is the role it plays in reducing the normal tax liability 
of the beneficiary and the trust itself. The structure in this chapter will follow the 
journal article by Brink & Willemse.108 However, the question whether a discretionary 
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trust is still an effective estate planning tool is beyond both the aim of this 
dissertation and this chapter and hence no attempts will be made to explore it. 
 4.2 Current Taxation of discretionary inter vivos trusts in South Africa 
From the tax period 1 March 2018 to 28 February 2019 all trusts that are not special 
trusts pay tax at a 45% flat rate while natural persons and special trusts are taxed on 
a graduated scale from 18% to 45% on their taxable income.109  Thus a discretionary 
trust is currently taxed at 45%. Although trusts are not entitled to the primary,110 
secondary111 or tertiary112 rebates as a natural person, they are nonetheless 
regarded as persons for purposes of assessing them to normal tax.113 Hence the 
question of their tax on income the trust pays over to the beneficiary is governed by 
section 25B of the Act114 subject to section 7of that Act. The capital gain element of 
the income is regulated by para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to that Act which is also 
subject to the capital gains rules contained in paras 68, 69, 71 and 72 in that 
Schedule. These rules operate in the same manner as those in section 7 in that their 
object is to bring back the capital gain realized by the trust to some other person the 
rules identify.  
It is thus suggested and true that the question as to in whose hands the income 
and/or capital gains of a discretionary trust is assessable to normal tax is dependent 
on following three factors:115 
“(a) the principle relating to accrual, 
(b) the conduit pipe principle, and 
                                                          
109 Budget 2018 Tax Guide. Available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2018/sars/Budget%202018%20Tax%20Guide.pdf 
(Accessed on 20/10/2018) 
110 Primary rebate for 2018/2019 tax year is R14 067. 
111 Secondary (Persons 65 and older) for 2018/2019 tax year is R7 713.  
112 Tertiary (Persons 75 and older) for 2018/2019 tax year is R2 574.  
113 Definition of ‘Person’ in section 1 of the Act 58 of 1962 includes a trust. See also Brink & Willemse 801. See 
further Stiglingh, M…et al SILKE: South African Income Tax (2017) 829. 
114 Stiglingh, M…et al Silke: South African Income Tax (2017) 831. See also M Loubser ‘A Case Study Analysis of 
the Impact of the Davis Tax Committee’s First Interim Report on Estate Duty on certain Trust and Estate 
Planning Structure Used by South African Residents’ (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2016) 55.   
115 Sections 25B and 7 of Act 58 of 1962. See also A Goebel ‘The Taxation of Trusts: An Analysis of s25B and the 
Anti-Avoidance Provisions contained in s7 of the Income Tax No. 58 of 1962’ (Unpublished LLM Dissertation, 
University of Natal, 1999) 13. 
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(c) certain provisions in the Act which govern deemed income.” 
This means that a discretionary trust creates three potential taxpayers – the creator 
of the trust, the trust in its own right and lastly the beneficiary. Before the provisions 
of the Act are discussed, it is necessary to first point out the most important basic 
principles underlying our law of taxation. These principles are discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
 
4.2.1 Basic principles of South African Taxation 
These principles are partly contained in section 5(1).116 This section provides as 
follows:  
“…subject to the provisions of the Fourth Schedule there shall be paid annually for the benefit 
of the National Revenue Fund, an income tax in respect of the taxable income received by or 
accrued to or in favour of – 
(c) any person ( other than a company) during the year of assessment ending during the period 
of 12 months ending on the last day of February each year; and…” 
 
The definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1 of the Act, adds further principles, 
namely that normal tax is payable in respect of taxable income ‘received by or 
accrued to or in favour’ of any person. A company is expressly excluded both 
because our law does not recognise a company as a ‘person’117 but as a ‘legal 
person’ and a company’s year of assessment may end in any month of the year 
depending on its founding documents. Although a company is not a person but a 
‘legal person’, it is not exempt from paying normal tax on its taxable income. A trust 
is included as it is a person for tax purposes.118  
From the above provision it follows that unless special circumstances exist, SARS 
must tax a person on either a ‘received by’ or ‘accrued to’ basis – whichever takes 
                                                          
116 Act 58 of 1962. 
117 A company is not contained in the list of persons in section 1 of the Act 58 of 1962. 
118 See the discussion of the legal nature of a ‘trust’ in our law in para 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
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place first.119 There is no discretion in this regard. The meaning of these terms are 
discussed in the following paragraph. 
 
4.2.2 ‘Received by’ or ‘Accrued to’ in Act 58 of 1962 
The definitions of both these terms are not contained in section 1 of the Act but they 
have been interpreted by the courts. 
As a general rule it was held in CIR v Delfos120 that the Fiscus does not have a 
discretion regarding the time when to include a particular amount in a person’s gross 
income - it may only include it when it is either received or accrued.121 Thus the 
amount is included in the gross income at the earlier of when it is received or when it 
accrues.122 
In Geldenhuys v CIR,123 the issue was that the taxpayer had sold a flock of sheep in 
respect of which she only had a usufructuary interest. The Commissioner sought to 
include the proceeds from the sale in the calculation of her taxable income. The 
court held that the term ‘received by’ required that which sought to be taxed to have 
been received by the taxpayer for their own benefit and the taxpayer in the present 
case had not received the proceeds of the sale within the meaning of this term. Thus 
the court held that the proceeds were received for the benefit of the bare dominium 
holders and not the taxpayer herself.124 
 
In Ochberg v CIR,125 the issue was whether the additional shares issued by the 
company to taxpayer, who already held 100% of the issued shares of the company 
were taxable. The court held that the shares had a value and had been received by 
the taxpayer within the meaning of ‘received by’ as they had been received by him 
                                                          
119 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 20. 
120 CIR v Delfos (1933 AD) 242 6 SATC 92. 
121 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 20. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Geldenhuys v CIR (1947 CPD) 14 SATC 419. 
124 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 20. 
125 Ochberg v CIR (1931 AD 215) 5 SATC 93. 
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for his own benefit. The possibility that the shares that he already held may have 
depreciated in value was irrelevant.126 
 
In ITC 1545,127 the meaning of ‘received by’ as construed in the above cases was 
challenged. The argument for the appellant was that an amount could only be said to 
have been received by the taxpayer if accrual to him/her has also taken place. This 
means that if the no accrual had yet taken place no receipt could be said to have 
occurred to the taxpayer resulting in the inclusion in his gross income of that amount. 
In rejecting this argument the court held, per Scott J, as follows: 
 
“Where, however, an amount is received by a taxpayer on his own behalf and for his own 
benefit but in pursuance of a void transaction there seems to me to be no reason for holding 
that such amount is not ‘received’ within the meaning of the section, if that word is to be given 
its ordinary literal meaning. Not to do so would lead to anomalies. It would mean, for example, 
that if a trader were to sell his goods on a Sunday in breach of a local by-law, the price paid 
to him would not be ‘received’ by him and would not for part of his gross income. I can find 
nothing in the Act to justify such construction; nor was any basis suggested by counsel for 
limiting the meaning of the word ‘received’ in this way. The mere fact that the receipt was the 
consequence of a void transaction is no reason for ignoring it. Indeed, it does not follow that 
because a contract is prohibited by statute and therefore void inter-partes, it is to be totally 
disregarded and all the consequences flowing from it ignored.” 
 
   The definition of the term ‘accrued to’ although also not contained in the Act, is well 
established through case law in the South African law of taxation. In CIR v Peoples 
Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd,128 the meaning of ‘accrual’ per Watermeyer J in W H 
Lategan v CIR129 was upheld and followed.130 In the latter case the issue was 
whether the purchase price payable partly in the year of the credit sale and partly in 
the subsequent tax year had accrued to the taxpayer in the first year of the sale 
                                                          
126 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 20. 
127 ITC 1545 (1992) 54 SATC 464. 
128 CIR v Peoples Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd (1990 (2) SA 353 (A)) 52 SATC 9. 
129 W H Lategan v CIR (1926 CPD 203) 2 SATC 16. 
130 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 23. 
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despite the fact that the balance was due and payable in that subsequent year as 
per the terms of the credit sale contract. The taxpayer, Lategan, argued that the 
amount that was payable in the following tax year could only accrue to him then. The 
court held that ‘accrued to’ means ‘become entitled to’ and that followed immediately 
after delivery of the subject of the sale to the buyer had taken place. Thus the full 
purchase price had accrued to Lategan. In following this reasoning by Watermeyer J 
in Lategan, the court in Peoples Stores (supra) held that ‘accrued’ was not defined in 
our law and meant to ‘become entitled to payment’. The fact that it may be only be 
due and payable outside the current tax year does not affect the position. Hence the 
space in time between sale and payment does not affect the accrual of the 
amount.131  
 
In Mooi v SIR,132 the court extended the scope of the ‘entitled to’ principle as was 
laid down in the above cases.133 The court in that case held that ‘accrued to’ requires 
that the taxpayer must have an ‘unconditional entitlement to the amount’. Thus if the 
entitlement is dependent on the occurrence of a future event then no ‘accrual’ can be 
said to have taken place until that future event has occurred.134 
It follows from the discussion of the above cases that an amount becomes taxable 
when it is ‘received by’ or ‘accrues to’ the taxpayer, and that both a receipt and an 
accrual are not necessary for taxation to take place. But most amounts are usually 
received by and accrue to a taxpayer. It must be pointed out that although an 
amount that is capital in nature will not be included in the gross income, it may still 
be subject to normal tax through the Eighth Schedule to the Act.135 Hence it follows 
that certain types of amounts may be excluded from a person’s gross income as will 
appear from the following discussion. 
 
                                                          
131 Ibid. 
132 Mooi v SIR (1972 AD) 34 SATC 1. 
133 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 23. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Section 102 of the Act 58 of 1962 state that the onus of poof rests on the taxpayer to prove that the 
amount is not subject to normal tax. The taxpayer can adduce any evidence in support of his or her claim in 
this regard. There is nothing that suggest that a court would only require a certain type of evidence. Thus it is 
up to each taxpayer how this onus of proof is discharged. 
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4.2.3 Provisions of the Act 58 of 1962 dealing with the taxation of income and capital 
gains of a resident trust 
4.2.3.1 Section 25B 
This section is the first section to consider in order to determine in whose hands the 
trust income is taxable.136 Hence it is called the ‘principal taxing section’ relating to 
trusts.137 This section provides that unless the deeming rules in section 7 apply the 
trust income is always assessable to normal tax in the hands of either the beneficiary 
or the trust.138 The question as to who is to be taxed in a particular case is contingent 
on whom that income vests.139 Thus if it vests in the beneficiary it will be taxed in his 
hands otherwise the normal tax liability will lie with the trust.140 
Subsections (1) – (3) of section 25B will not be cited again here in full. These 
subsections were fully covered in Chapter 1.141  Section 25B(1) provides as 
follows:142  
“…to the extent to which that amount has been derived for the immediate or future benefit of 
any ascertained beneficiary who has a vested right to that amount during that year, be deemed 
to be an amount which has accrued to that beneficiary, and to the extent to which that amount 
is not so derived, be deemed to be an amount which has accrued to the trust.” 
 
Although in truth the amount has not been received by the beneficiary it is, unless 
the attribution rules in section 7 apply, assessable in his or her hands in terms of this 
subsection owing to the vested right of the beneficiary. It is immaterial whether or not 
the income is actually paid to the beneficiary in that year - the income has accrued to 
him. The tax benefit inherent in the income being vested in the beneficiary is that the 
beneficiary is taxed at a graduated scale from 18% to 45%. Otherwise the income is 
taxed at a 45% tax rate in the hands of the trust. It appears from the use of the words 
                                                          
136 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 805. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Note 19 in Chapter 1 (Above). Section 25B is cited verbatim in that note. 
142 Act 58 of 1962. 
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“…ascertained beneficiary...” that before the question of vesting may be considered 
the beneficiary must be capable of being identified or must be known.   
 
Section 25B(2) provides that:143 
“Where a beneficiary has acquired a vested right to any amount referred to in subsection (1) 
in consequence of the exercise by the trustee of a discretion… that amount shall for the 
purposes of that subsection be deemed to have been derived for the benefit of that 
beneficiary.” 
The income of a trust is still assessable at a 45% flat rate in the trust up to the point 
that the trustee exercises their discretion and distributes the income to the 
beneficiary.  
Section 25B(3) regulates the deductions and allowances that the beneficiary or the 
trust may claim on the amounts deemed to have been received by or accrued to 
either of them. It provides that:144 
“…to the extent to which that amount is under that subsection deemed to be an amount which 
has accrued to –  
(a) a beneficiary, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the 
determination of the taxable income derived by that beneficiary;  
(b) the trust, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the 
determination of the taxable income derived by that trust.”  
 
This section ensures that deductions and allowances claimed are directly linked with 
each amount for which such a deduction or allowance is sought. This means the 
beneficiary may claim such a deduction or allowance on that amount, or a portion 
thereof, is deemed to be his. This applies equally to the trust.  Thus the deduction or 
allowance may be allocated between both the trust and beneficiary 
proportionately.145 
                                                          
143 Act 58 of 1962. 
144 Act 58 of 1962. 
145 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 806. 
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The entitlement on deductions and allowances under section 25B(3) discussed 
above is not absolute. Section 25B(4)  prohibits the deductions and allowance that 
may be claimed by the beneficiary or the trust during the year of assessment from 
exceeding the total income accruing to the beneficiary from the trust in terms of 
section 25B(1).146  
 
Section 25B(5) provides that:147  
“The excess of expenditure over income in s25B(4) shall be deducted by the trust in that year 
but limited to the taxable income of the trust before the deduction of such expenditure. Where 
the trust is not subject to tax in South Africa, the excess expenditure is carried forward and 
treated as a deduction or allowance which the beneficiary may claim in the year from the 
amount (income) he or she gets from the trust.” 
In essence this subsection ensures a match between the expenditure that the trust 
incurred and the income from which the deduction is claimed. The excess of 
expenditure incurred in the current tax year cannot be claimed in the following tax 
year – it must be claimed in the tax year during which it arose only. 
 
Section 25B(6) provides that:148 
“ If the trust cannot absorb the full deduction or allowance disallowed to the beneficiary 
the excess may be granted as a deduction or allowance to the beneficiary in the next 
year of assessment subject to the same limitation as in s25B(4)” 
This subsection ensures that the excess expenditure is not lost in the year it arose 
owing to the trust not having had enough income to claim the deduction on. The 
beneficiary may use the excess expenditure carried forward from the previous tax 
year to reduce his or her taxable income in the current tax year notwithstanding the 
fact that the excess expenditure was not incurred in respect of that taxable income. 
 
                                                          
146 Act 58 of 1962. 
147 Act 58 of 1962; P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 805-806. 
148 Act 58 of 1962; P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 806. 
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Section 25B(7) provides that:149 
“The provisions of s25B(4) – (6) do not apply in respect of any amount deemed to have 
accrued to any beneficiary in terms of s25B(1) where the beneficiary is not subject to tax in 
South Africa on that amount.” 
This subsection provides that even though the beneficiary may have deductions or 
allowances that he or she may claim on the amount vested in him or her that 
deduction is only limited to amounts that are taxable in his hands in South Africa. 
Hence it does not matter whether the beneficiary is a South African resident or not – 
only the ‘South African’ amount must be subject to tax in South Africa. 
 
A trust can only distribute taxable income to the beneficiary and not losses.150 It is 
barred from doing so by the provisions of section 25B(4) – (6).151  
 
4.2.3.2 Section 7 
If section 7 applies it enjoys preference over section 25B because the latter section 
is made subject to the provisions of section 7.152 Section 7 is essentially an anti-
avoidance section deeming back to the donor of the trust income that arose by 
reason of the donor’s donation or similar disposition.153 Hence the provisions of 
section 7 are only concerned with the person who injected the asset(s) into the trust 
and not the person who brought the trust into being.154 
The most important subsections of section 7 which could affect income distributed by 
or retained in trusts are 7(2)(a), 7(3), 7(5), 7(6), 7(8), 7(9), 7(10) and 7(7) to a lesser 
extent.155 The circumstances that may trigger the application of each subsection are 
considered hereunder. 
 
                                                          
149 Act 58 of 1962; Ibid. 
150 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 806. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
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Section 7(2) 
This subsection finds application where a spouse donates to a trust or grants an 
interest-free loan to the trust and income arising from any of these actions by the 
other spouse is distributed to the other spouse. Consequently the first spouse is 
taxed on that income as if it is his.156 
 
Section 7(3) 
This subsection applies if ‘by reason of’ a donation, settlement or similar disposition 
made by a parent income is then received by a child of that parent.157 Although that 
income is received by the child it is deemed to be that of a parent. 
 
Section 7(5) 
This subsection only applies in respect of income that is retained by the trust and 
such income arose ‘in consequence of’ a donation, settlement or disposition.158 
 
Section 7(6) 
This subsection only applies to income distributed by the trust if the following 
requirements are present or met:159 
 There is a stipulation in the deed of donation that the right to receive income 
may be revoked and possibly be conferred on another; 
 The power to confer this right to receive income is retained by that person 
who conferred that right to the recipient of that income. 
The income so received is deemed to be that of the person retaining those 
powers to revoke that right to receive that income. 
 
                                                          
156 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 807. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 808. 
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Section 7(8) 
Section 7(8)(a) only applies if owing to a donation that was made by a South 
African resident to a trust an amount is received by or accrues to a non-
resident.160  
 
    The provisions of section 7 and its subsections do not apply unless there is a 
‘donation, settlement or other disposition’. These terms are not defined in this 
section.161 However our courts have defined them in the following cases: 
 
‘Donation’ 
In Welch’s Estate v CSARS,162 the court considered the meaning of this term in 
section 55(1) of the Act and held that “a ‘donation’ requires a motive of sheer 
liberality or disinterested benevolence.”163Thus a donation is a “wholly gratuitous 
disposal made out of the donor’s liberality or generosity.”164 The disposal still 
qualifies as a donation even if is for a consideration that is illusory, simulated or 
minimal.165 
 
‘Settlement’ 
A settlement is also a gratuitous disposal of property that is made on “certain 
terms and conditions often to the trustees of a trust.”166 In Bulmer v IRC,167 it was 
held that a ‘settlement’ had an element of bounty.168 
 
‘Other disposition’ 
                                                          
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Welch’s Estate v CSARS, (2004) All SA 586 (SCA), 66 SATC 303.  
163 Ibid. 
164 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 808. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 English case of Bulmer v IRC (1967 CH 145 1966 ALL ER 801. 
168 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 808. 
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This term has caused problems because it is clearly an ambiguous term.169 The 
uncertainty as to its meaning which had existed for years was because of its 
origin in the Rhodesian case of Barnett v COT,170 which held that the meaning of 
this term was not only limited to a gratuitous disposal but it extended to include a 
transfer, transaction, plan, scheme or arrangement not in the gift form.171 
This interpretation was, with respect, wrong as it brought all possible forms of 
transferring ownership over in assets within the application of section 7.172 The 
uncertainty as to the meaning of this terms was finally resolved in 1980 in the 
following two cases.173 In Ovenstone v SIR,174 it was held that “the words ‘other 
disposition’ should be interpreted ejusdem generis with ‘donation’ and 
‘settlement’, i.e. having the same meaning as donation and settlement, and that 
the section should be read as ‘donation, settlement or other disposition’.”175 
 
In Joss v SIR,176 it was held, per Coetzee J, that “ ‘other disposition’ excluded 
transaction that were made for full value in money or money’s worth and there 
had to be an element of liberality.”177 
The meaning of ‘disposition’ is now certain and according to the interpretation 
from these two cases it means “any disposal of property made, either wholly or to 
an appreciable extent, gratuitously out of the liberality or generosity of the 
disposer.”178  
 
‘By reason of’ in section 7(3) 
                                                          
169 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 808. 
170 Barnett v COT (1959 FC) 22 SATC 326. 
171 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 808-809. 
172 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ovenstone v SIR (1980 AD);Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Joss v SIR (1980 TPD), SATC 206;Ibid. 
177 Joss v SIR (1980 TPD); P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809. 
178 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809. 
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Two cases have interpreted this term and are authority with regard to its 
meaning. In Ovenstone v SIR,179 Mr Ovenstone granted to his two children loans 
at an 8,5% interest rate per annum to purchase shares. The arrangement was 
that they would repay the loans out of the dividends from these shares. Each 
child received R6000 as a dividend in the 1969 year of assessment. The issue 
before the court was whether the Revenue Service (currently ‘SARS’) was correct 
in taxing these dividends received by Mr Ovenstone’s children in his hands in 
terms of section 7(3). It was held that the tax assessment was correct as the 
children concerned received those dividends ‘by reason of’ the initial loans 
provided to them by Mr Ovenstone. Thus section 7(3) was correctly applied. The 
court further held that the words ‘other disposition’ meant a disposition with an 
element of gratuity. Thus the charging of a favourable rate of interest on the loan 
was in fact a gratuitous disposal and hence it was only the part of the dividends 
that related to the gratuitous part of the disposition that had to be deemed his in 
terms of section 7(3). The tax assessment on the full amount of dividends, 
however, was allowed by the court because Mr Ovenstone was unable to provide 
to the court a reasonable method of apportionment. 
 
In Joss v SIR,180 Mr Joss sold shares to a certain company in which only he and 
his minor children were shareholders on loan account. The issue in this case (as 
in Ovenstone discussed above) was whether the dividends income received by 
Mr Joss’ minor children could be taxed in his hands in terms of section 7(3). The 
court held that the sale of shares to the company could not be a gratuitous 
disposition as it was made at fair price and neither was the loan that arose 
pursuant to this sale. However, the non-charging of interest on the loan was in 
fact a gratuitous disposition and the interest-free loan brought about a continuous 
donation of interest to the company which partially benefited his children. Thus 
the donation of interest fell within section 7(3) but was not a donation attracting 
donations tax. Accordingly, the dividend income had to be allocated between the 
amount of the loan arising from the sale of shares and the interest not charged on 
                                                          
179 Ovenstone v SIR (1980 (2) SA 721(A)), 42 SATC 55; P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809. 
180 Joss v SIR (1980 TPD), 41 SATC 206; Ibid. 
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that loan. Consequently, only that part of the dividend that related to the non-
charging of interest could be taxed in his hands in terms of section 7(3). 
 
‘In consequence of’ in section 7(5) 
In CSARS v Woulidge,181 Mr Woulidge set up two identical trusts for his two 
children and then sold shares in a company to these trusts on loan account. 
Although he sold these shares at their market value, he charged no interest on 
the loan. The issue before the court was whether the sale was a disposition 
falling within the ambit of section 7(3). The court held as follows: 
(a).For purposes of section 7(3) an apportionment must be done where a 
disposition contains both appreciable elements of gratuitousness and of proper 
consideration in order to accurately determine how much is to be deemed a 
parent’s in terms of that section;  
(b).The sale of the shares in question at their full value could not qualify as a 
‘gratuitous disposition’; 
(c).The non-charging of interest is a continuing donation up until the capital is 
paid. Although an interest-free loan itself could not be a donation, in the present 
case it was a donation due to the fact that there was a contractual right on Mr 
Woulidge’s side to charge interest – which he did not charge. Hence the non-
charging of interest under these circumstance was in fact a disposition within the 
terms of section 7(3); 
(d).The interest that Mr Woulidge had to charge but did not is the portion of the 
income to be deemed his in terms of section 7(3); and  
(e).Mr Woulidge’s non-charging of interest constituted an appreciable element 
and the gratuitous disposition had to be calculated by compounding interest on 
the loan as long as the loan remained unpaid. The court further held that the in 
duplum rule did not apply with the result that such interest could continue to be 
compounded.  
                                                          
181 CSARS v Woulidge (62 SATC 1, [1999] 4 All SA 519 (C); P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809-810. 
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It follows from the above cases that ‘in consequence of’ and ‘by reason of’ 
occurring in section 7 bear the same meaning.182 Thus income arising ‘by reason 
of’ is also arising ‘in consequence of.183 What is crucial is apportioning or 
allocating such income between the gratuitous and non-gratuitous parts of the 
disposition.184 Although the court in CSARS v Woulidge (above) held that interest 
on an interest-free loan could be compounded, SARS calculates it on a simple 
basis in practice.185 
 
4.2.3.3 Para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 58 of 1962 
Sections 25B and 7 discussed above only apply to the income element of 
taxpayer’s taxable income.186 The Eighth Schedule contains the deeming rules 
that regulate the capital element of taxable income in paragraph 80.187  
Para 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act provides as follows:188 
 
“(1) Subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72, where a capital gain is determined in respect 
of the vesting by a trust of an asset in a trust beneficiary (other than any person 
contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a resident, that gain –  
(a) must be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary to whom that asset was so disposed of.  
(2) Subject to paragraphs 68, 69, 71 and 72, where a capital gain is determined in respect 
of the disposal of an asset by a trust in a year of assessment during which a trust 
beneficiary (other than any person contemplated in paragraph 62(a) to (e)) who is a 
resident has a vested interest or acquires a vested interest (including an interest caused 
                                                          
182 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid, 810. 
186 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 809-815. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid, 847. 
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by the exercise of a discretion) in that capital gain but not in the asset, the disposal of 
which gave rise to the capital gain, the whole or portion of the capital gain so vested-  
(a) must be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the trust; and  
(b) must be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the aggregate capital gain or 
aggregate capital loss of the beneficiary in whom the gain vests.” 
 
The trust is liable for CGT on disposals of trust assets unless the special rules in 
paras 80(1) and 80(2) above apply.189 These rules divert the CGT liability to 
another person.190 Para 80(1) is triggered by the acquisition of an interest in an 
asset of the trust by the resident beneficiary.191 Para 80(2) applies when a 
beneficiary under a trust has only a vested interest in the capital gain realized.192 
Both these sub-paras determine that the gain must be disregarded by the trust 
but be included in determining the aggregate capital gain and loss of the 
beneficiary of that trust.193 These rules reinforce the conduit pipe nature of the 
trust in relation to the capital gains.  
 
4.2.4 Nature of income and tax benefits of the conduit pipe principle 
The Act requires certain amounts to be completely excluded from the calculation of a 
person’s taxable income while other amounts are only partially exempted therefrom. 
Those amounts are exempt notwithstanding the fact that they were either ‘received by 
or accrued to’ the taxpayer. These exemptions are dealt with in section 10.194 Section 
10(1)(i)(i) grants a resident taxpayer that is a natural person a partial exemption on the 
amount received by or accrued to him or her from a South African investment.  This 
section provides as follows: 
“There shall be exempt from the tax- 
                                                          
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Act 58 of 1962. 
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(i) in the case of any taxpayer who is a natural person, so much of the aggregate of any interest 
received by or accrued to him or her, other than interest in respect of a tax free investment as 
defined in section 12T(1), from a source in the Republic as does not during the year of 
assessment exceed- 
(i) in the case of any person who was or, had he or she lived, would have been at least 65 
years of age on the last day of the year of assessment, the amount of R34 500; or 
(ii) in any other case, the amount of R23 800.” 
Amounts received in the form of dividends are also exempt from the calculation of 
taxpayer’s taxable income in terms of section 10(1)(k).195 This section provides as 
follows: 
“There shall be exempt from the tax- 
(k)(i) dividends (other than foreign dividends) received by or accrued to or in favour of any 
person: Provided that this exemption shall not apply- 
(aa) to dividends (other than those distributed out of profits of a capital nature 
and those received by or accrued to or in favour of any person who is neither a resident, nor 
carrying on business in the Republic) distributed by a company the shares of which are 
'property shares' as defined in section 47 of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 
2002, on shares included in a portfolio comprised in any collective investment scheme in 
property managed or carried on by any company registered as a manager under section 42 
of that Act for purposes of Part V of that Act; or…” 
 
It is worth noting that the provisions of section 10(1)(k) enjoy authority over those of  
paragraph (k) in the ‘gross income’ definition.196 That paragraph specifically includes 
in the gross income of a taxpayer any dividend he or she receives during the tax 
year and the origin of that dividend, i.e. local or foreign is not relevant – it must be 
included. However, section 10(1)(i) exempts only interest that arose within South 
Africa.197 By means of a comparison it is clear from the provisions of both these 
exemptions that one gives a total exemption whereas the other only grants a partial 
                                                          
195 Act 58 of 1962. 
196 Paragraph (k) of the definition of ‘gross income’ in section 1 of Act 58 of 1962 includes in the gross income 
of a person any amount received or accrued by way of a dividend or a foreign dividend. 
197  P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 85. 
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one. Consequently, the interest exemption is limited to the following amounts:  
R34 500 for person who is 65 years or above198 and R23 800 for a person under 65 
years.199 Even though a person in receipt of a dividend may be a South African 
resident he is not entitled to the dividends exemption if that dividend arises from the 
circumstances mentioned in item (aa).200 
Dividends tax is currently levied at a flat rate of 20% on any amount paid as a 
dividend by a company that is not a headquarter company.201 The company 
withholds this amount (20%) and distributes the net amount to the shareholder of 
that dividend who will then not pay normal tax on it.202 The shareholder is exempted 
from paying normal tax on the dividend by section 10(1)(k) of the Act. 
The benefit that the conduit pipe principle has always offered for South African 
taxpayers (natural persons only) is that although dividends and interests from a 
South African source is received by the trust, the beneficiaries will still be able to 
claim both the above exemptions on the amounts distributed to them by the trust. 
The discussion that follows will attempt to expose what will happen to the identity of 
a South African dividend and interest income from South African investments if the 
‘common law conduit pipe principle’ is finally abolished in our law. This exposition is 
considered both from a case where the trustee exercises it discretion in paying over 
the ‘discretionary trust’ income to the beneficiary and where that discretion is not so 
exercised. Thus any referral hereinafter to the ‘trust income’ or just a ‘trust’ should be 
taken as referring to the ‘discretionary trust’. 
 
4.2.5 Current determination of normal tax where the trustees pay over income in 
their own decision203 
 
                                                          
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid, 87. 
201 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 466. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Adapted from the case study done by Brink & Willemse. See Note 15 (above) 804-807.   
53 
 
For the purposes of the following calculations the following assumptions or 
suppositions are made: 
(1). The Zwezwe Family Trust is a South African discretionary trust with a single 
beneficiary. The beneficiary is also a South African resident and a natural person 
below 65 years of age. Hypothetically the income of this family trust is composed of 
the following amounts that it received during the 2018 year of assessment:  
a) R4 million from selling a capital asset; 
b) R80 000 as interest derived from a local investment; and 
c) R100 000 representing local dividends.  
 
(2).This scenario is on the footing that the conduit pipe principle still applies and that 
no deductible allowance under the Act was previously claimed and granted in 
respect of the asset sold in (a) above. This asset was purchased for R3 million. 
Table ‘A’ demonstrates the current determination of the normal tax liability flowing 
from the discretion of the trustee. In Table ‘A’ this discretion is exercised in paying 
over the income of the trust to the beneficiary during the tax year 2018.  
 
 
Table A 
Normal tax liability of The Zwezwe Family Trust Amounts (R)  
Taxable income            0 
Explanation: 
There is no taxable income, as all the mentioned accruals 
vest in the beneficiary in the same year of assessment in 
which the amounts were received by or accrued to the 
trust.204 The amounts vest in the beneficiary owing to the 
trustee’s discretion.205 For the purposes of this scenario it is 
assumed the beneficiary is in receipt of no other income. 
 
                                                          
204 See section 25B(2) of the Act 58 of 1962 in Note 19 (Above). 
205  Brink & Willemse 804. 
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Normal tax liability of the beneficiary Amounts (R) 
Gross income:      180  000 
                    Dividends from a South African Company      100  000 
                    Interest amount from South African investment         80  000 
Less: Exemptions:      123 000 
                         Interest exemption (section10(1)(i))206        23  800 
                         Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k))207      100  000 
Income:        57  000 
Plus: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)208      384  000209 
Taxable income      441  000210 
Ordinary income tax      108  219211 
Less: Primary rebate        13  635 
Normal tax due to SARS        94  584 
  
Explanation: 
As seen from the above calculation of the normal tax liability for both the Zwezwe 
Family Trust and its beneficiary all the receipts of the trust are vested in the 
beneficiary in terms of the provisions of section 25B(2) and hence are taxable not in 
the trust but in the beneficiary’s hands. The benefit of the ‘conduit pipe principle’ is 
that the beneficiary is entitled to claim the section 10(1)(k) exemption on the portion 
of the income attributable to the dividend income, the basic interest exemption, the 
annual exclusion of R40 000 on capital gain realised and the primary rebate of R13 
635. 
    
The following scenario will consider the tax implication flowing from the non-exercise 
of the trustee(s) discretion to distribute the trust income during the 2018 year of 
assessment. 
                                                          
206 Act 58 of 1962. 
207 Act 58 of 1962. 
208 Act 58 of 1962. 
209 Capital Gain calculation: ([R4 000 000 – R3 000 000] – R40 000) R960 000 × 40% = R 384 000. 
210 During the 2018 tax year the beneficiary was in receipt of no other income. 
211 Calculation of ordinary income: R97 225 +36% = R108 219. 
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4.2.6 Current determination of normal tax where the trustees do not pay over income 
in their own decision212 
 
If the very same information used in the above scenario is applied except that the 
trustee’s discretion is now not exercised, the current determination of the tax liability 
will be as illustrated hereunder. 
Table B 
Normal tax treatment of The Zwezwe Family Trust     Amount (R) 
Gross income :      180  000 
                    Dividends from a South African Company      100  000 
                    Interest amount from South African investment        80  000 
Less: Exemptions:        80  000 
                               Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k))      100  000 
Income        80  000 
Plus: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)      800  000213 
Taxable income      880  000 
Ordinary income tax      382  500214 
Normal tax due to SARS      396  000 
 
Explanation: 
Table B illustrates how the normal tax liability of The Zwezwe Family Trust is 
determined with no vesting of income vests in terms of section 25B(2). Hence the tax 
assessment is made in the hands of the trust at a 45% flat rate. As the trust is not a 
natural person it is accordingly only entitled to the dividends exemption. It does not 
also qualify for the R40 000 annual exclusion on its capital gains and neither qualify 
to claim the primary rebate of R13 635 available to natural persons.  
                                                          
212 Adapted from the case study done by Brink & Willemse. See Note 15 (above), 804-807. 
213 Capital Gain calculation: (R4 000 000 – R3 000 000) × 80% = R800 000. 
214 Calculation of ordinary income: R880 000 × 45% = R382 500. 
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The above two tables considered the normal tax liability of both the beneficiary of 
‘discretionary trust’ and of the trust itself. The determination of the normal tax liability 
is done in the above tables to reflect the current tax benefit of the ‘common law 
conduit pipe principle’ to the beneficiary. In the latter’s determination of normal tax 
liability the exempt amounts are as such even when they are in his/her hands. The 
trust in respect of these amounts operates as a ‘slide’ between one point and 
another - connecting the source of these amount and the beneficiary thereof. It is 
clear from these calculations that a discretionary trust has quite significant tax 
advantages for a taxpayers owing to the tax implications associated with the 
exercise of a trustee’s discretion. As seen from the preceding calculations the high 
tax rate (45% for the current 2018/19 year of assessment) applicable to trusts can 
always be escaped by vesting the trust income in the beneficiary.  
While the above tables considered the determination for normal tax liability with the 
common law conduit pipe principle still being part of our law of taxation, the following 
hypothetic scenarios will attempt to show how the determination will be different from 
the above with this principle no longer part of our law. The first scenario will 
determine the liability where the trust receipts and accruals vested in the beneficiary 
owing to the exercise of the trustee’s discretion.  The last scenario will consider the 
tax liability on the footing that the trust receipts and accruals do not vest in the 
beneficiary  
 
4.2.7 The trustee’s discretionary vesting of income in the beneficiary where the 
conduit pipe principle is abolished215 
 
The information used for Table A and B above is still used for the purposes of the 
illustrations in Table C and D. However, Table C and D considers the hypothetical 
tax implication for both the trust and the beneficiary  where the trustees of the trust 
decide to distribute all of the income to the beneficiary during the 2018 year of 
assessment with the conduit pipe no longer part of our law. 
                                                          
215 Adapted from the case study done by Brink & Willemse. See Note 15 (above), 806. 
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Table C (The conduit pipe principle is no longer part of our law) 
Calculation of normal tax liability for The Zwezwe Family 
Trust 
    Amount (R) 
Gross income :       180  000 
                        Dividends from a South African Company       100  000 
                        Interest amount from South African investment         80  000 
Less: Exemptions:       100  000 
                                    Dividend exemption (section 10(1)(k))       100  000 
Income:         80  000 
Plus: Taxable capital gain (section 26A)       800  000216 
Taxable income       880  000217 
Deduct: Distribution to beneficiary of taxable income       850  000218 
 
Explanation: 
The Zwezwe Family Trust is only entitled to claim the dividends exemption but not 
the R13 635 primary rebate available to a natural person and the R40 000 annual 
exclusion on capital gains realised. The trust distributes only taxable income to the 
beneficiary because it does no longer possess the ability to pass exempt amount. 
The hypothetical case here is that the common law conduit pipe principle is no 
longer part of our law. Thus the beneficiary will not be able to claim both the 
dividends exemption and the basic interest exemptions because the different 
amounts making up the income distributed no longer have their original character. 
 
                                                          
216 Capital Gain calculation: (R4 000 000 – R3 000 000) × 80% = R800 000. 
217 This amount of R880 000 represents an amount that The Zwezwe Family Trust can claim as a deduction in 
its determination of normal tax liability. However, this amount as it distributed to the beneficiary within the 
same tax year (2018) it arose will be taxable only in the beneficiary’s hands not the trust. 
218 The proposed taxation of discretionary trusts means that where the receipts and accruals of the trust are 
vested in the beneficiary the trust will be able to claim the amount it distributed to the beneficiary in its 
taxable income. The result is that such distributed income will be taxable only in the beneficiary’s hands. 
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Table D illustrates a hypothetical normal tax calculation for the beneficiary where the 
conduit pipe principle is abolished.  
 
Table D (The conduit pipe principle is no longer part of our law) 
Calculation of normal tax liability of the beneficiary     Amount (R) 
Taxable income received from The Zwezwe Family Trust       850  000219 
Taxable income       850  000220 
Ordinary income tax       267  124221 
Less: Primary rebate         13  635 
Normal tax due to SARS       253  489 
 
Explanation: 
It is clear from the above calculation that the distribution of the taxable income by 
The Zwezwe Family Trust will result in no normal tax liability on its part as it will be 
entitled be deduct the income it distributed to the beneficiary as a deemed deduction. 
However, the income distributed to the beneficiary is taxable in its own hands. As the 
conduit pipe principle is no longer available the character of each amount making up 
the total distribution is lost with the result that the beneficiary cannot claim the basic 
interest exemption, the annual exclusion of R40 000 on capital gains realised but 
only the primary rebate of R13 635. 
    
4.2.8 The trustees do not vest the income in the beneficiary where the conduit pipe is 
abolished222 
 
                                                          
219 This amount is distributed to the beneficiary during the same tax year it arose. See Note 150 (above). 
220 The beneficiary had no other receipts and/or accruals during the current tax year, 2018. 
221 Calculation of normal income tax: R209 032 + 41%= R267 124. 
222 Adapted from the case study done by Brink & Willemse. See Note 15 (above), 807. 
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Where the receipts and/ or accruals of The Zwezwe Family Trust are not vested in 
the beneficiary and retained in the trust the normal tax determination will be as 
illustrated in Table B above. The same result would follow even in the event the trust 
is taxed in its own right notwithstanding whether the beneficiary has a vested right to 
the receipts and accruals of the trust. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
From the above comparison of the tax liability for both the discretionary trust and the 
beneficiary using the current calculations of liability with the conduit pipe principle still 
part of our law and a hypothetical scenario where this principle is no longer part of 
our law, it is clear that if the principle is finally abolished the normal tax implication 
would be severe for the beneficiary as only the primary rebate of R13 635 would be 
available. Discretionary trusts would only distribute taxable income. The amount 
passing through these trusts would no longer retain its nature as is the case 
presently. It is true that if this principle is abolished discretionary trusts may not be as 
attractive as they are now in future. However, from the protection of assets 
perspective these trusts will still be as effective as they presently are.223  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
223 See paragraphs 4-5 of Chapter 5 for detailed reasons against the abolition of the conduit pipe principle in 
our law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The common law conduit pipe principle is one of many other principles in South 
African tax law that taxpayers have come to exploit in the trusts. This exploitation 
has to a large extent resulted in the real purpose of this principle being confused for 
tax avoidance. The operation of this principle has the effect that a discretionary trust 
is a conduit pipe in respect of a dividend received by a resident taxpayer from a 
South African company and interest income from a South African investment. These 
types of amounts, including capital gains made by a trust, retain the identity until the 
reach the hands of the beneficiary. The main aim of this study was to clarify the 
confusion in relation to the purpose and value of this principle in our law and answer 
the core research question – whether we should retain this principle in our South 
African law. To determine the real purpose of this principle this research traced this 
principle back to Armstrong which introduced it into our law, in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. By an in-depth analysis of the judgment of this case it was found and 
submitted that the real purpose of this principle was not prevent an incident of taxing 
the amount both at the source and again in the recipient’s hands. Hence although it 
possesses the ability of being used to avoid normal tax, this was never within its 
intendment as per the judgment in Armstrong.  
 
 Chapter 3 of this dissertation explained that our courts have played a major role in 
developing a set of characteristics which, if they are all present in a particular case, 
then a trust can be said to exist. Hence whether a trust may be a testamentary trust 
or an inter vivos trust, the shared characteristic is that the property is always held by 
the trust on behalf of someone – a beneficiary which may be certain or uncertain at 
that point. It was also found that ii is always important to determine the nature of a 
right that the beneficiary has under the discretionary trust as the tax treatment of that 
income is contingent on the nature of the beneficiary’s right. 
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Chapter 4 discussed the normal tax implication of the beneficiary’s right to the 
income and/or capital gains of a discretionary trust. It focused on the benefit of the 
conduit pipe principle in the taxation of a discretionary trust and revealed how these 
trusts would be taxed if this principle is abolished and that amounts received by 
discretionary inter vivos trusts, would no longer retain their original character. This 
means that the tax advantages of claiming the section 10 exemptions from the 
calculation of taxable income will fall away with the result that the distribution of that 
amount is income in the hands of the beneficiary. Unless the income of the trust is 
vested in the beneficiary, it will be subject to a harsh 45% tax rate in the trust.  
 
Chapter 5 found that if this conduit pipe principle is done away with in our law 
discretionary inter vivos trust will undoubtedly no longer be as attractive as they have 
been over the years. However, it was also found that even if this principle is 
abolished and section 25B and Para 80 are repealed discretionary trusts will remain 
an effective device for a taxpayer who wants to use this type of trust for other 
purposes other than for taking advantage of the conduit pipe principle. Although the 
DTC has persistently recommended the abolition of this principle, it is submitted that 
it still remains part of our South African law. This follows from the fact that the 
intention to abolish this principle was not repeated in the 2018 National Budget 
Speech as had been anticipated. Neither has there to date been an Amendment Bill 
proposing the repeal of the conduit pipe principle in in section 25B and para 80 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. Other than the increase of the tax rate for ordinary trusts 
from 41% to 45% there is no change to the taxation of discretionary trusts in our law. 
It is submitted that the 4% increase is a measure that is hopefully adopted to 
discourage the use of trusts.  
 
It is concluded that this principle should be retained in our law owing to the purpose 
that it is really meant to serve, and which still remains relevant today. The National 
Treasury and SARS ought to find other less drastic measures to discourage the 
exploitation of the conduit pipe principle to avoid normal tax, as outlined in this 
dissertation.  
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